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CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION
LISA MARSHALL MANHEIM

When Richard Hasen wrote Election Meltdown,1 he didn’t yet know that
Donald Trump had, in the days before taking office, openly delighted in the low
turnout among Black voters.2 Nor did Hasen know that the President would so
brazenly push for reduced voting rates as he sought his own reelection—that he
would, for example, threaten to block funding for the Postal Service in an effort
to prevent mail-in voting;3 authorize his campaign to sue states for using ballot
drop boxes;4 or insist, without citing legal authority, that he would send “law
enforcement” to the polls.5 Of course, Hasen didn’t need these data points. He
had predicted it all.
In Hasen’s prescient work, he identifies the four horsemen of the 2020
elections: administrative incompetence, dirty tricks, inflammatory rhetoric,
and—leading the charge—voter suppression. These four phenomena are
distinct, and they all pose deep threats to American elections and democracy.
Yet it is the last of these four horsemen, what I call intentional voter suppression,
that is dominating news cycles as November approaches. This focus is
appropriate. Not only does intentional voter suppression exacerbate the three
other dangers that Hasen identifies; it fundamentally undermines any
meaningful effort at reform.



Charles I. Stone Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
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By intentional voter suppression, I mean any action taken with the intent to
make it less likely that an eligible voter’s ballot will be cast or counted.6 The
emphasis here is on intent; if an official makes an election-related decision with
the intent to save money, for example, or with the intent to reduce administrative
burden, that action may have a suppressive effect.7 However, it is not intentional
voter suppression.8 So defined, intentional voter suppression describes only a
narrow slice of election-related activity. Yet the implications of this activity are
widespread and profoundly corrosive.
At its core, intentional voter suppression, particularly by those charged with
election administration, cannot be reconciled with a universalist conception of
voting.9 This universalist view has dominated mainstream American discourse
(including in the courts) since the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
Under this view, the right to vote inheres in every citizen, not only those that the
dominant factions wish to empower.10 Contrast this understanding with what
came before it: a world in which it “was perfectly within the bounds of ordinary
political discourse to argue that some citizens were too ignorant, incompetent,
corruptible, racially inferior, or poor to deserve the voting rights of full, firstclass citizens.”11 It is impossible to overstate the injustice that accompanied this
prior regime. Officials openly and aggressively suppressed the votes of Black
citizens, among others, in order to maintain a system of oppression that was
designed to subordinate those whose votes had been suppressed. This toxic cycle
caused unacceptable harm and undermined democratic legitimacy. The
country’s transition to a universalist conception of voting—coupled with
meaningful mechanisms to effectuate it, such as the Voting Rights Act—
constitutes one of the most profound advances in civil rights and democratic
governance in the history of America and beyond.
6 See Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room:
Intentional Voter Suppression, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 216.
7 Like Hasen, I am reluctant to endorse, even by passing reference, the idea that officials
might legitimately engage in a range of suppressive measures for the purpose of combatting
“voter fraud”—a concept that, in Hasen’s language, has been repurposed to serve as a “sham
perpetrated by people who should know better, advanced for political advantage.” HASEN,
supra note 1, at 128.
8 Under my definition, if the official has a mixed intent that also includes the desire to
make it harder for eligible voters to cast a ballot or have it counted, that action still would
qualify as intentional voter suppression. And unless the official would have taken the same
action in the absence of that impermissible intent, it should be considered unconstitutional.
See Manheim & Porter, supra note 6, at 250.
9
See id. at 240-41.
10 It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned (and the U.S. population largely
has accepted) a small number of exceptions to this principle of universality, including those
relating to age, residence, felon status, and mental capacity, as well as citizenship status. The
brevity of this list helps to prove the general rule.
11 Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289,
1342-43 (2011).
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For half a century, this broad conception of voting rights has survived, despite
persistent efforts to undermine it. To take one of many examples, when Senator
Cindy Hyde-Smith of Mississippi was caught on camera in 2018 arguing that
she didn’t want “liberal folks” to vote and that it would be “great” to make the
process more difficult for them, she did not double down on this assertion when
it received widespread coverage. Instead, her team insisted that the comment
was a joke and that the video was misleading.12 This pattern of denial is common
among those seeking to suppress votes. While it is easy to dismiss the pivots as
disingenuous, that is beside this particular point: disingenuous or not, these
denials help to confirm the power that this universalist conception of voting has,
even among those not genuinely committed to the idea. This resilience is
important. Assuming history is any guide, voting in this country—not to mention
the state of society more generally—is fundamentally more unjust and
undemocratic when officials, judges, and others in power openly endorse the
idea that the state should facilitate the ability of only some people to vote.
Despite the resilience of this universalist conception of voting, there is no
guarantee that a nation or community will remain committed to it. And one of
the problems with intentional voter suppression is that it gives credence, at least
on the margin, to a more restrictive view of the franchise—one where
incumbents decide who is worthy of a vote. This effect threatens to be
particularly pronounced when intentional voter suppression is brazen, officially
endorsed, or not resoundingly condemned.
In light of these stakes, Election Meltdown is right to lead with voter
suppression, rather than the other three dangers that Hasen identifies. Of course,
they too require attention. Take administrative incompetence. There is no
question that it warrants concern. It’s just that any competence-related reform
relies on a universalist understanding of the franchise; otherwise, the anxiety
shifts to whether officials will use this “competence” to prevent some voters
from casting a ballot. Likewise, the existence of dirty tricks (which Hasen
implicitly defines as illegal or near-illegal activity that disrupts the voting
process or manipulates public opinion) unquestionably justifies close attention.
It’s just that the dirtiest of tricks—widespread disenfranchisement, de facto or
otherwise—is suddenly on the table if a community wavers in its commitment
to universal voting rights. (Moreover, “dirty tricks” can become “lawful
measures” once those in power change the rules.) Finally, inflammatory rhetoric
also warrants concern. It’s just that, at some point, it becomes appropriate—not
inflammatory—to object to an election’s legitimacy on the grounds that the state
has actively undermined voters’ ability to cast ballots.13

12 Michael Brice-Saddler, GOP Senator: It’s a ‘Great Idea’ to Make It Harder for ‘Liberal
Folks’
to
Vote,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
16,
2018,
10:08
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/16/cindy-hyde-smith-its-great-ideamake-it-harder-liberal-folks-vote.
13 It is impossible to identify with precision—as a matter of theory or description—when
exactly this line has been crossed. Cf. James A. Gardner, Democratic Legitimacy Under
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Despite these overlaps, Hasen persuasively makes the case that all four of
these dangers threaten the country as it heads into a presidential election and,
accordingly, that each necessitates reforms. And he’s right to note that “less
sexy” proposals, such as those associated with technical improvements to online
voter registration, often get overlooked amid heated fights over voter
suppression. Hasen may even be correct to suggest, as an illustration, that, in a
world in which such numbers were knowable, “many more votes may be saved
by competent election administration than by stopping voter ID laws.”14 Despite
these observations, the entire house is built on a foundation—a universalist
understanding of voting rights—that intentional voter suppression has been
jackhammering. Anyone committed to democracy-minded reforms must be
hypervigilant regarding these destructive effects.
There are, in Hasen’s words, “no miracle cures.”15 Still, there are options.
Voters could, and should, cast their ballots to oust any official who engages in
voter suppression. This electoral check does not always work—see, for example,
the 2018 gubernatorial election in Georgia,16 among others—but at times it does,
with voter suppression rightfully spurring some constituents to get out and vote.
Legislative reforms could also help. One option would be to pull administration
of elections apart from electoral accountability. Stated otherwise, jurisdictions
could insulate election administrators from political pressure. This approach has
great potential so long as the reforms can ensure no corruption or capture. As for
the courts, they could, and should, push back against intentional voter
suppression by clarifying that the practice is unconstitutional—a basic step that
the Supreme Court has failed to take.17 Courts truly committed to a universal
conception of voting rights could go even further by coupling this declaration of
unconstitutionality with a burden-shifting regime that would help to suss out
illicit intentions.18
But perhaps most important, from a long-term perspective, is education. Out
of context, it may be difficult to convince some people of the profoundly high
stakes implicated by fighting over a drop box in Philadelphia or calling for poll
Conditions of Severely Depressed Voter Turnout, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, (June 26, 2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/26/pandemic-gardner/ [https://perma.cc/4SUPGZES] (identifying scenario in which an election is “so thoroughly compromised” by these
sorts of problems that it triggers “a full-blown crisis of regime illegitimacy” and describing
tipping point as “entirely a matter of inherently standardless political judgment”); see also id.
(concluding that, notwithstanding these difficulties of measurement, recent developments
reveal that “the risks to democratic legitimacy from low turnout [in the 2020 elections] are
disturbingly high”).
14
HASEN, supra note 1, at 131.
15
Id. at 127.
16 Maggie Astor, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp Faces Investigation by House Panel,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/governor-briankemp-voter-suppression.html.
17 See Manheim & Porter, supra note 6, at 224-32.
18 Id. at 248-54.
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watchers in Atlanta—much less “joking” about making it harder for some
classes of voters to vote. But in the context of history, the stakes are clear. The
universalist conception of voting stops feeling like a debatable abstraction and
instead reveals itself to be what it is: a moral, political, and practical imperative.

